- Full-disk encryption enforced on workstations
- Host firewall enabled on workstations
- TLS on all public surfaces, with HSTS and a hardened response-header set
- Production database bound to loopback and the private network only, never a public interface
Branded Mayhem Collective
Branded Mayhem Collective is the Richardson, Texas holding company behind 8gnc, the agency, and br8n, the practice that installs AI-delivery capability inside client organizations.
We build and operate digital systems for other people’s businesses, so how we handle access, secrets and data is a fair thing to ask about before the first engagement.
What follows is what we actually run, verified rather than asserted — alongside a register of what we have not closed yet. The gaps are published on purpose. A wall of green checks with nothing behind it is easy to write and worth nothing to a reviewer.
Compliance
BMC holds no certification in any framework below. Our 1 August 2026 SOC 2 self-assessment scored 48.7% readiness: 6 controls met, 25 partial and 7 missing across 38 controls. The audit has not been performed yet. Controls are being brought to evidence one at a time, after which a single unified audit will be performed by an independent firm — Schellman and A-LIGN are the two we are weighing. Until that firm issues a report, everything here describes our own work, not a third party’s attestation.
Resources
Controls
Verified 1 August 2026- Multi-factor authentication required across the source-control organization
- Secrets centralized in a managed secret store; no plaintext secrets in source
- Security-awareness evidence includes 70 continuing-education credits across four dated credentials
- Initial AI system register, risk assessment and impact assessment documented for BMC-operated AI use
- Pull requests required across all active repositories, with deletion and non-fast-forward updates blocked
- Application error monitoring with alerting
- Sub-processor inventory maintained, each vendor agreement verified against its actual terms
- Privacy rights requests accepted through a monitored channel with a documented handling procedure
- Global Privacy Control is honored on this site for advertising-consent signals
- Data residency documented per system and disclosed in the sub-processor table
- Off-site backups on a scheduled cadence, encrypted in transit and verified present
- Isolated application-data restore passed integrity, fidelity, 24-hour RPO and 48-hour RTO targets
- Source control mirrored one-way to separate off-site storage, daily
- Uptime monitoring with alerting on public surfaces
Open gaps
Published deliberately. Every entry names the gap, where it actually stands, and what happens next — no gap is listed without a plan.
No certification, and the audit has not been performed
BMC holds no ISO, SOC 2, or equivalent certification. Readiness work is underway and controls are being brought to evidence against the frameworks above, but no independent firm has examined us and no report exists.
Controls are brought to evidence first, then a single unified audit by an independent firm covering the frameworks above rather than one engagement per standard. Certification marks and reports appear on this page when that firm issues them, and not a day earlier.
Application data is not encrypted at rest
The self-hosted database runs on a cloud server whose volume is not encrypted at rest. Our hosting provider’s data processing agreement puts at-rest encryption for cloud servers on us rather than on them, and we have not implemented it yet. Data is encrypted in transit, the host sits behind an authenticated tunnel with no database port exposed to the internet, and the provider holds ISO 27001 and BSI C5 Type 2 certification covering physical and operational security of the facility. None of that is the same as encryption at rest, so we list it here rather than let the workstation line imply it.
Move the data volume onto an encrypted block device. This is a rebuild-and-restore rather than a toggle, so it is sequenced with the restore drill below — the drill proves the restore path the migration depends on.
Backups are not encrypted at rest
Off-site backups run on schedule to BMC-controlled storage and travel over an encrypted transport, but the archives themselves are not encrypted at rest and the destination volume is not an encrypted share. Physical control of that storage is the only thing standing behind it today.
Encrypt the archives at creation so the protection travels with the file rather than depending on where it lands. Until that ships, this page will not use the word encrypted about backups at rest.
Restore testing has one successful point-in-time pass
A source-control restore drill passed on 26 July 2026. An isolated PostgreSQL and Convex application-data restore then passed integrity and fidelity checks and met the 24-hour recovery-point and 48-hour recovery-time targets on 27 July. Those are point-in-time results, not recurring Type II evidence.
Both restore paths fold into a quarterly drill with dated results retained for the observation window. One successful exercise proves the path works; recurring evidence proves the control keeps working.
Core policies and the risk register await Owner adoption
The risk register now maps 28 risks to treatments and controls, and the core security policy set exists in draft. Neither has the signed Owner adoption evidence required to treat governance as an operating control.
Review, approve and sign the policy set and risk register, then retain versioned adoption and annual-review evidence.
The incident-response program is not adopted or exercised
Monitoring and escalation paths exist, but the incident-response plan has not been formally adopted and no tabletop exercise has produced evidence that the team can execute it.
Adopt the response plan, assign named roles, run a tabletop against a realistic scenario and record findings, owners and remediation dates.
Security monitoring and endpoint hardening are incomplete
BMC does not yet operate a complete vulnerability-scanning program, EDR or SIEM, scheduled log reviews, managed-device enforcement, or application allowlisting. Repository rules also do not yet require an approving review or passing status check before merge.
Sequence the baseline as vulnerability scanning and required repository checks first, then managed-device, endpoint-detection and centralized review controls with retained operating evidence.
The access review is not fully attested
Access-control procedures and inventories exist, but the current review is not complete across every system and does not yet carry the Owner attestation needed for audit evidence.
Complete the system-by-system access review, remove or justify exceptions, obtain Owner sign-off and repeat it on a fixed cadence.
One content platform routes to AI providers we do not control
Our content management platform names OpenAI, Google Cloud and Anthropic as its own sub-processors, and its agreement does not limit hosting to the European Union. Content placed in that platform can therefore reach AI providers through the vendor’s supply chain rather than ours. Our internal policy governs what we put into AI tools; it does not reach what a vendor does downstream, and we would rather say so than let the sub-processor list imply a tighter boundary than exists.
Establish per-client whether that platform is the right home for their content, and disclose this chain in the engagement rather than at the point a questionnaire finds it. Where a client needs AI processing kept out of the content layer, the platform choice changes.
No DPA-backed BMC-operated client AI plane or active technical routing control
A fail-closed routing guard has been implemented and unit-tested in source, but it is not yet activated in BMC’s operating dispatcher. No BMC-operated client AI route is active today. Client data therefore has no permitted fallback to a personal subscription; client work remains in the client’s own licensed environment until the operating control and commercial evidence are complete.
Activate the guard and a client route only after the commercial agreement, executed DPA, isolated Doppler project and client-specific processing decision are evidenced. Client-ZDR use remains inactive until a client requirement and compatible provider terms are in place.
No Content-Security-Policy
Public surfaces carry HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy and Permissions-Policy, but no CSP.
Staged: report-only CSP first, tightened on collected violation evidence, then enforced. A rushed policy full of unsafe-inline would be worse than none.
HSTS preload staged, not complete
HSTS is live on all three domains with a one-year max-age and includeSubDomains. The preload token now serves on this domain; the other two carry it in configuration but have not shipped the deploy that puts it on the wire. No domain has been submitted to the browser preload list, and submission is not accepted until a domain is already serving the token.
Submit this domain after a 30-day observation window, then the other two once their deploys land. Preload is difficult to reverse, which is the whole reason for the wait.